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In two experiments, we investigated whether chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, can use self-experience to infer what another sees. Subjects first gained self-experience with the visual properties of an object (either opaque or see-through). In a subsequent test phase, a human experimenter interacted with the object and we tested whether chimpanzees understood that the experimenter experienced the object as opaque or as see-through. Crucially, in the test phase, the object seemed opaque to the subject in all cases (while the experimenter could see through the one that they had experienced as see-through before), such that she had to use her previous self-experience with the object to correctly infer whether the experimenter could or could not see when looking at the object. Chimpanzees did not attribute their previous self-experience with the object to the experimenter in a gaze-following task (experiment 1); however, they did so successfully in a competitive context (experiment 2). We conclude that chimpanzees successfully used their self-experience to infer what the competitor sees. We discuss our results in relation to the well-known 'goggles experiment' and address alternative explanations. © 2015 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Mentalizing, or possessing a 'theory of mind', refers to the ability to ascribe unobservable mental states to oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) . Whether this ability is uniquely human or shared with nonhuman primates is still highly controversial. Advocates of great apes' mentalizing capabilities can by now list an abundance of studies that support their view (for reviews, see Andrews, 2005; Call, 2007; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Whiten, 2013) . In contrast, sceptics are still not convinced and explain positive results by nonmentalistic processes, such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmentalistic categories (Heyes, 1998; Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Povinelli & Vonk, 2004) . Some theorists doubt that distinguishing reasoning about another's mind from responding to behavioural cues alone will ever be possible, as inferences about another's mental state are inevitably based on their behaviour (Lurz, 2009; Purdy & Domjan, 1998; Shettleworth, 2010) .
Heyes (1998) proposed one way to distinguish mentalizing skills from nonmentalistic processes. The design was later refined by Povinelli and Vonk (2003, 2004) and became known as the 'goggles experiment'. In this theoretical study, primate subjects first gain experience with two pairs of mirrored goggles in a training phase. From the outside, both goggles differ only in their rim colour. However, when wearing them, subjects experience one as opaque and the other as transparent. In the subsequent test phase, two experimenters wear the goggles such that one can see, while the other cannot. The subject is now allowed to beg for food from one of the experimenters. If primates are able to mentalize, they should use their own mental experience to infer the others' mental states, and prefer begging from the experimenter who wears the seethrough goggles. Crucially, subjects never observe others interacting with the goggles, so effects from observational learning can be excluded.
Although well known and perhaps the clearest way of demonstrating mentalism in a nonverbal animal, there have since been few attempts to implement the study. Penn and Povinelli reported negative results for chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, in a study in which they used (instead of goggles) buckets with opaque or seethrough visors (Vonk & Povinelli, 2011) . In contrast, Meltzoff and Brooks (2008) conducted a study with 18-month-old infants that resembled the goggles experiment. They provided two groups of children different experience with the view-obstructing properties of blindfolds. Both blindfold types looked opaque from the outside, but one could see through the 'trick blindfolds' when they were
